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“Turn him to any cause of policy,
The Gordian knot of it he will unloose,
Familiar as his garter.” 1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Let us consider a hypothetical situation: Obioma is an indigene of
Adele, a local community, rich in oil and gas in Federal Republic of
Ouchi. Obioma has never appreciated the continuous flaring of gas
by Osusu, a multi-national corporation (MNC) which has resulted in
the darkening of the sky in his hometown of Adele. After careful
thought of the environmental degradation, oil pollution, gas flaring
resulting in acidic rain, he considers that the activities of Osusu had
infringed his fundamental human rights. He enlisted the services of
an NGO.
Initially, they engaged in a name and shame approach to get the
company to change. Obioma travelled approximately 800 kilometers
to the corporate head office of Osusu to report his grievances. He
was shocked that there was no grievance mechanism in place by the
company. Firstly, at the company’s front gate was an inscription:
“Direct all queries and complaints to the following numbers . . . .”
The indicated numbers were written with paint marks which were
almost fading. He managed to get the numbers after straining his
eyes. The response he got from the first call was that the owner of
the number had left the services of the company. The second number
never went through. Dissatisfied, he went back to his community
without any success. If those numbers were genuinely complaint
numbers, the firm would have taken measures to update its record to
know when a staff in charge of complaints has relocated or left the
company. The numbers would be written legibly and boldly. The hypothetical situation above is just a reflection of the level of impunity
and destruction perpetrated by MNCs in weak zones. This unfortunately is the bane of extractive resource governance in resource rich,
sub-Saharan African nations.
Experiences in some resource rich African countries have shown
that MNCs neither care much about the effects of their activities, nor
do they create a grievance mechanism to resolve conflicts arising
from their operations. The African continent hosts over two-thirds of
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the world’s reserves of platinum, which are essential in the electronic
industry. 2 These resources present both challenges and prospects.
However, countries in the Global South can leverage the resources to
accelerate broad-based economic development, poverty reduction,
and prosperity for their citizens. Unfortunately, harnessing the benefits of the resources have been problematic, 3 for not only have these
countries failed to reap the benefits of the resources, but the development of the resources has in fact triggered violent conflicts, destroyed the environment, exacerbated inequalities across gender and
geography, displaced communities, and undermined democratic governance. However, there are also instances where effective management of the resources has produced sustainable and equitable human
development. 4 It is generally believed that what makes the difference
between countries in the Global North and those of the Global South
is the design and implementation of a broad set of policies and programs. 5
The Ruggie Framework and the Guiding Principles for its implementation place great emphasis on states as duty bearers under international law. Corporations, on the other hand, are mere subjects.

2. See African Economic Outlook 2013: Structural Transformation and Natural Resources, AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 40 (2013) (citing Africa’s share of
global production of PGMs in 2010 as 74%).
3. See Hany Besada, Franklyn Lisk & Phillip Martin, Regulating Extraction
in Africa: Towards a Framework for Accountability in the Global South, 2(1)
GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 1, 1 (2015) (“[M]any countries do not reap the full benefits of their extractive resource endowments.”).
4. Id. at 8 (noting Botswana as a prime example of how best to use natural
resources to expedite economic growth and development, while enforcing polices
to process its mined diamonds locally and creating a strong private sector aimed at
transforming its development path towards achieving sustainable outcomes); see
JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 39 (2002) (explaining
Botswana’s negotiations for control of diamond mines); see also Equity in Extractives: Stewarding Africa’s Natural Resources for All, AFRICAN PROGRESS PANEL
14 (2013), http://app-cdn.acwupload.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/2013
_APR_Equity_in_Extractives_25062013_ENG_HR.pdf (citing the World Bank’s
categorization of Botswana in the upper-middle class average income group of Africa’s resource rich countries).
5. See generally Bonnie Campbell, Introduction, in MINING IN AFRICA:
REGULATION AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 18-19 (Bonnie Campbell ed., 2009) (stating
the ultimate goal of the Extractive Industries Review is to raise “social and environmental considerations so they are balanced with economic considerations in efforts at poverty alleviation through sustainable development”).

ABE ACTUALLY FOR PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

898

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

4/30/2017 2:46 PM

[32:4

Remarkably, in most resource rich, conflict ridden African countries,
corporations are the largest beneficiaries of illicit minerals being exploited. In the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), warlords and guerillas controlmineral resources in that part
of the country. The State becomes helpless in enforcing certain minimum international human rights thresholds because it does not have
control over the guerillas, yet MNCs continue to conduct business
with these revolutionaries, thus maximizing profit at the detriment of
the local population.
This article challenges the notion that corporations cannot be held
accountable for human rights violations under international law. It
particularly discusses the extent of corporate accountability for human rights violations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Part one is the introduction. Part two focusses on contextual analysis of some case studies in
the Global South to explore the extent of governance gaps brought
by globalization. Part two also argues for the reputational model of
compliance by states as a means of fulfilling their duty to protect
human rights. Part three discusses the implementation of the Guiding
Principles. Part four considers the various approaches through which
the Guiding Principles, though voluntary, can be implemented in resource rich but weak states. Part four also discusses local participation in resource governance. It argues that the free, prior and informed consent rule developed by the United Nations should be
implemented. This will give the local communities a say on matters
that affect them. Part five concludes the article.

II. CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK AND
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH
To put the issues in perspective, I begin this article with some case
studies. Analyzing the extent of atrocities that has plagued mineral
exploitation in the DRC, Margot Wallstrom observed that “the number of women and children raped in the DRC has risen dramatically
because of a surge in rebel militia activity. . .in times of fighting you
usually see also rape, refugees, stealing, killing and the burning of
houses going up.” 6 It seems, therefore, that the proceeds of mineral
6. E.g., DR Congo Rape Study ‘Questionable’, BBC (May 18, 2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13448513
(reporting
that
Margot
Wallstrom described DR Congo as “the rape capital of the world”).
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exploitation are controlled and go to the warlords who can appropriate it. Still on the DRC, a Congolese gynecologist, Dennis Mukwege,
has become so distraught with the stories he gets from his patients.
One of them goes thus:
Every day, ten new women and girls who have been raped show up at the
hospital. Many have been so sadistically attacked from the inside out,
butchered by bayonets and assaulted with chunks of wood, that their reproductive and digestive systems are beyond repair. . .the culprits are described as young men with guns. . .home grown militias called the MaiMai who slick themselves with oil before marching into battle. . .my oldest patient was 75, youngest 3. Some of these girls whose insides have
been destroyed are so young that they don’t understand what happened to
them. They ask me if they will ever be able to have children, and it’s hard
to look into their eyes. 7

While countries in the Global North, with or without oil, have
been more peaceful and prosperous, many countries in the Global
South, particularly those with vast natural resources are getting poorer, and domestic growth is declining at an alarming proportion. 8 For
these countries, extracting resources tends to energize corruption,
damage institutions, and destroy social fabric. 9 The vast natural resources do not commensurate with the level of poverty and quality of
life of their citizens.
In Nigeria, the Ogoni experience has shown how a community can
suffer tremendous environmental degradation due to the deleterious
effects of corporate bodies. This community was able to achieve its
crusade against the then Nigeria’s military junta and major oil com-

7. Jeffrey Gentleman, Rape Epidemic Raises Trauma of Congo War, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 7, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/07/world/africa/ 07congo.
html.
8. See Evolution of average income in Gabon, 1950-2015, WORLD WEALTH
& INCOME DATABASE, http://wid.world/country/gabon/ (charting Gabon’s average
income and showing it has fallen by half since 1976); see generally African Economic Outlook 2013: Structural Transformation and Natural Resources, supra
note 2, at 92-93, 122, 163-65, 178-79, 181-82 (describing the stymied growth of
various African nations due in large part to Guerilla warfare).
9. See Ivar Kolstad & Arne Wig, Testing the Pearl Hypothesis: Natural Resources and Trust, 37 RESOURCES POL’Y 358, 358-67 (2012) (arguing that an indirect influence of natural resources on trust is mediated by inequality, corruption
and civil war).
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panies 10 through social movements such as the Movement for the
Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP). 11 The comprehensive United
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) report in its assessment of
about 200 locations in Ogoni found that due to the decades of oil exploration and blowouts, oil spillage, oil slicks, gas flaring, and waste
discharge, the once alluvial soil of the Niger-Delta is no longer viable for agricultural use and attributes the widespread decay land degradation. 12 Yet, shortly after Nigeria’s independence in 1960, Nigeria
had a robust agricultural industry. The country relied on agricultural
produce for sustenance and was the world’s leading exporter of palm
oil and ground nuts. 13 Since the discovery of crude oil, however, the10. E.g., The Ogoni Crisis: A Case-Study of Military Repression in Southeastern Nigeria, HUM. RTS. WATCH 1 (1995), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/
1995/Nigeria.htm [hereinafter The Ogoni Crisis] (noting MOSOP’s confrontations
against the government and major oil companies, most notably Shell Oil); see, e.g.,
Olof Linden & Jonas Palsson, Oil Contamination in Ogoniland, Niger Delta, 42
AMBIO 685, 685-701 (2013) (analyzing the impact and extent of oil pollution in
Ogoniland); accord RHUKS AKO, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: PERSPECTIVES FROM AFRICA AND ASIA-PACIFIC 23-41 (2013) (discussing the substantive and procedural issues related to environmental justice in
Nigeria); see Susana C. Mijares Pena, Human Right Violations by Canadian Companies Abroad: Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc., 5 W. J. OF LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-19
(2014) (arguing that tort liability should exist for human rights violations that result from corporate activities abroad); see also Barisere Rachel Konne, Inadequate
Monitoring and Enforcement in Nigerian Oil Industry: The Case of Shell and
Ogoniland, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 181, 181-204 (2014) (detailing the conflict between the Ogoni people and Shell Oil).
11. Timothy Hunt, The Politics of Bones: Dr. Owens Wiwa and the Struggle
for Nigeria’s oil (McClelland & Stewart 2006); Hari M. Osofsky, Learning from
Environmental Justice: A New Model for International Environmental Rights, 24
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1-58 (2005); e.g., OBIORA CHINEDU OKAFOR, LEGITIMIZING
HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS: LESSONS FROM NIGERIA 39-41 (2006) (explaining the origins and emergence of MOSOP); see, e.g., MOVEMENT FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE
OGONI PEOPLE, http://mosop.org/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2016) [hereinafter
MOSOP] (providing further information about the Ogoni people); see generally
Fons Coomans, The Ogoni Case Before the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 749, 749-60 (2003) (highlighting the African Commission’s promotion of strong economic, social, cultural and collective
rights for individuals in African countries).
12. See Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland, U.N. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROGRAM 9-12 (2011), http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/OEA/UNEP_
OEA.pdf (summarizing UNEP’s field observation and scientific investigation findings).
13. E.g., Palm Oil Value Chain Analysis in the Niger Delta, FOUNDATION FOR
PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVES IN THE NIGER DELTA (PIND) 1 (2011),
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se products disappeared. Nigeria, a land of exceptionally fertile oil,
remains a net importer of food today. 14
In South Africa, the Marikana incident started as a wildcat strike
by workers working at a mine owned by Lonmin, a British company. 15 The company has spent large sums of money on a massive program of expansion, which left it financially vulnerable. 16 It then fired
12,000 striking South African miners after a protracted strike over
wages. This incident led to sporadic strikes across the South African
mining sector. The strike arose out of poor labor standards. Workers
and the local communities were not receiving the dividends of mining and good corporate behavior was absent; youth unemployment
was on the increase, the living conditions of the mineworkers was
appalling, and growing inequalities were evident. 17 The strike that
ensued saw about forty-four platinum miners shot dead by the South
African police on August 16, 2012.18 Black workers are exploited
http://www.ndpifoundation.org/images/researchreports/reports/Palm-Oil-ValueChain-Analysis.pdf (“Up until the 1960s, Nigeria was the world’s largest producer
of palm oil accounting for 43% of global palm oil production.”).
14. Simon Utebor, Nigeria Spends $22 bn yearly on Food Imports, PUNCH
(Sept. 12, 2016), http://punchng.com/conoil-urges-safe-driving-sallah/.
15. See Proclamation No. 50 of 2012, Published in Government Gazette No.
35680 of 12 September 2012, “Marikana Commission of Inquiry: Report on Matters of Public, National and International Concern arising out of the Tragic Incidents at the Lonmin Mine in Marikana, in The North West Province,”
http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/marikana-report-1.pdf (last visited March
17, 2017). See also Oli Abegunde, Causal Factors and the Dynamics of Resource
Conflicts in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Niger Delta and Marikana¸ 3 INT’L
J. HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. INVENTION 27, 33-34 (2014)
(In late January to February 2012, there was tensions between the traditional miners’
union, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the younger AMCU over
strikes and call[s] for pay rises at the Impala platinum mine in Rustenburg in which
AMCU was accused of using violent tactics and of trying to impede negotiations to
further its own membership drive by unions such as NUM which has been losing support.).

16. See Lonmin: About Us, https://www.lonmin.com/about-us/about-usoverview (last visited Jan. 30, 2016) (stating that Lonmin’s core operations consist
of “eleven shafts and inclines” situated in the Bushveld Igneous Complex in South
Africa, which hosts “nearly 80% of global PGM resources”).
17. See Lonmin an Example of Exploitation, SAPA (Aug. 17, 2012),
http://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/lonmin-an-example-ofexploitation-1365221#.Vj2FX_mrTIW (citing “lack of employment opportunities
for local youth, squalid living conditions, unemployment and growing inequalities”
as contributing to exploitation of the mines).
18. Miners Shot Down, UHURHU PRODUCTIONS (May 30, 2014),
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and work like slaves as rock drillers to this day. Poverty forces many
of them to forget their ambition and leave school. 19
Extractive resource governance has been a significant challenge
for countries in the Global South. While corporate organizations lack
moral and social license to operate, states fail to defend their citizens
against corporate culture of impunity. In drawing a sharp distinction,
Leif Weiner argues that compared to resource curse, climate change
looks easy. 20 With climate change, the causes and cures are easily
understood, the solution would be to “reduce the sum by reducing the
summands.” 21 For extraction of natural resources, the supply chain
which determines the end users is difficult to account for who and
what went wrong. Those who extract resources sell to manufactures
who then sell to retailers and eventually gets to the consumers. How
then does one determine the guilty party in this chain of distribution?
For instance, most, if not all Apple products today bear the inscription: “Made in China” but “Designed in California.” The complexity
in this demarcation is that Apple has successfully created a disclaimer for any minerals used in the manufacture of its products. These
minerals could have been sourced from the DRC, thereby indirectly
contributing to ethnic wars over minerals.
If these extractive resources are managed well in the Global South
(which they are often not), they risk contaminating or poisoning the
air and water, degrading the environment, and dislocating livelihoods
and cultural practices of local communities. Gas flaring, strip mines,
oil pollution, and acid rain are examples of the damage exploration
of natural resources can cause. Thus, extractive industries have the
capability to distort and damage the natural order of things. Only an

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cbvHU3wxj4E (showing live footage of the
shooting).
19. Id.; see Liduduma’lingani Mqombothi, “Miners Shot Down;” A Haunting
and Emotional Documentary, AFRICA IS A COUNTRY (May 30, 2014),
http://africasacountry.com/2014/05/miners-shot-down-a-haunting-and-emotionaldocumentary/ (highlighting the poverty by describing Lonmin management’s refusal “to negotiate with the rock drillers’ demands of R12,500 per month” as the
core reason for the strike and violence).
20. LEIF WENAR, BLOOD OIL: TYRANTS, VIOLENCE, AND THE RULES THAT
RUN THE WORLD (Oxford Univ. Press 2015).
21. Id. at xxiii.
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effective and extractive resource management can prevent the negative externalities associated with extractive resource project.

A. CONCERTED EFFORTS TOWARDS NORM IMPLEMENTATION
The examples from the preceding section reveals the culture of
impunity by States and MNCs in the extractive resource governance
in some countries of the Global South, particularly in Sub-Saharan
Africa. While some countries have done fairly well within this classification, Botswana, Bolivia, and Ecuador for instance, most African
states still grapple with leadership and governance management. The
polarized debate on the binding versus voluntary nature of the Guiding Principles questionably share the same goal – to strengthen accountability for business-related abuses, however, they only adopt
significantly different approaches in achieving that goal. The foregoing is based on two salient observations: Firstly, State governments
in Africa are unwilling to enforce their domestic laws or court judgments when it comes to business and human rights disputes. 22 Unfortunately, this is where our efforts should be focused. Rather than externalize responsibility and allow the African continent to be treated
like eternal children seeking protection from adults who are miles
away from their borders, African leaders should focus attention on
implementation programs and policies. Today, Bolivia and Ecuador
are under leftist governments, they exercise their sovereignty, yet
they ensure that the dignity of their populations is more paramount.
African leaders can do the same. Extractive resource management in
Africa should not be done by proxy in the Global North. For instance, courts in the United States, and lately, the Netherlands, are
enforcing their laws on behalf of Ogoni people and other human
rights violations occurring abroad, while Nigeria would not, neither
will they conduct due diligence on companies and negotiate better

22. See Gbemre (on behalf of Iwheraken Community, Delta State) v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Corp. (2005) FHC/B/CS/53/05 21 (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (noting that the
Attorney-General of Nigeria regrettably did not put up any appearances, and/or defend the proceedings); see generally Gas Flaring Lawsuit (re: Oil Companies in
Nigeria), BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR., https://businesshumanrights.org/en/gas-flaring-lawsuit-re-oil-companies-in-nigeria (last visited
Oct. 16, 2015) (explaining Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Corp. and showing the
earliest attempt at seeking judicial enforcement of human rights violation by victims of corporate abuse).
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contractual deals on behalf of its citizens. 23
Secondly, MNCs were simply unprepared for the need to manage
the risks of causing or contributing to environmental rights harm
through their own activities and business relationships, hence the
numerous litigations against them. The fact that this is being litigated
means that the MNCs find it difficult to adapt to changing circumstances under the business and human rights regime. Firms operate in
highly challenging contexts. When things go wrong, the companies
are quick to blame the local community of sabotage. On the other
hand, the indigenous people claim that the companies are not doing
enough in terms of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The simple
logic therefore is if the companies treat the local communities very
well, these communities will in turn accept the companies and voluntarily provide security for company the firm’s installations. Weak
zones can function as “law-free zones” where human rights violations are subject only to self-restraint and litigation in another jurisdiction “based on statutes with extra-territorial reach.” 24 The questions that follow therefore are why do companies behave the way
they do when it comes to respect for human rights? Where the States
fail to fulfill their duty of protecting human rights, should firms also
contribute to the failure of the State to uphold certain basic minimum
standards of behavior. These questions lead us to briefly examine the
implication of non-implementation of normative structures set by the
United Nations.

B. BASIS FOR COMPLIANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Theories define a concept and through them, we see the underlying perception behind a notion. Although the theories surrounding
CSR have been developed since the 19th century, 25 the concept continues to evolve as dynamics of globalization increases and economic
23. See Doe v. Nestle USA, Inc., 738 F.3d 1048, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that corporations can face liability for claims brought under the Alien Tort
Statute); see also Rb. Gravenhge januari 2013 C/09/337050 m.nt. para. 5.1 (Akpan/Royal Dutch Shell PLC) (Neth.) (rendering judgment that the SPDC committed a specific tort of negligence against Akpan).
24. JOHN G. RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 33 (2013).
25. VED P. NANDA & RALPH LAKE, THE LAW OF TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS ).
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freedom expands. With the increasing debate on business and human
rights, CSR has created revolutionary responsibilities for corporate
organizations. The enforcement of CSR initiatives has been nuanced
by the understanding that the Westphalian regime allows states as
duty bearers under international law. Since MNCs have no liability
under international law, how may they be found culpable for international human rights violations? 26 While the MNCs domiciled in developed countries comply with all regulatory laws in their home
countries, developing countries grapple with enforcing corporate
codes of conduct. It is not the intention of this work to discuss extensively the notion of CSR. Suffice it to say that the concept of CSR
is pivotal to the actualization of the business and human rights agenda. However, considering the fact that the international community is
becoming inundated with nefarious activities of MNCs operating in
the extractive industries in weak and conflict zones, a brief discussion of the reputational model of compliance will be carried out.
1. Reputational Model
In the business and human rights debate, the issue has been norm
compliance against the argument that soft laws are not laws so to
speak. States care about their reputation with international law. A
state is respected for being a strong democratic state if it recognizes
the rule of law and enforcement of judicial decisions. Any State that
does not respect its own laws will have leadership legitimacy problems. It is countries, not companies, that own natural resources;
companies only help extract those resources for benefit of the countries primarily. 27

26. Cf. Eugene Kontorovich, Kiobel Surprise: Unexpected by Scholars but
Consistent with International Trends, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1671, 1693 (20132014) (arguing that many countries have backed away from requiring strict compliance with international law for multinational corporations; for example, the
United States reinforces this concept in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S.
Ct. 1659 (2013) which limited the principal of extraterritoriality for multinational
corporations).
27. See generally J.R. Mailey, The Anatomy of the Resource Curse: Predatory
Investments in Africa’s Extractive Industries, ACCS SPECIAL REPORT 1-6 (May
2015) (discussing the relationship between a multinational corporation and resource-rich African countries).
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At the international level, unfortunately, there has not emerged an
enforcement regime strong enough as obtainable under domestic
state laws to enforce compliance with international law. The situation
is more precarious when such rule of international law is one of normative value. 28 To date, scholars of norm compliance have not been
able to sufficiently address the synergy between law and normative
values in the compliance debate. Most work has centered on why
States obey international law; few works, if any, has extended that
debate to the need to comply with commitments arising from normative structures agreed under the auspices of the United Nations. 29
States must have gone through some stages to arrive at legally enforceable agreement. The question that follows is why States would
now find it difficult to commit or comply with solemnly agreed rules
which they contributed to negotiate. 30
One emerging school of thought focuses on morality of states to
obey international law. 31 The principle of ‘uberrimae fidei’ in the law
of contract stipulates that contracts must be carried out in good
faith. 32 At the onset, Ruggie engaged in a wide stakeholder attempt at
contributing to the business and human rights debate. States would
have rejected the move and decided not to be part of the consultation

28. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 213-15 (Oxford University
Press, 2d ed. 2005) (providing an overview of different approaches to implementing international law on the national level).
29. Compare Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1840-72 (2002) (suggesting numerous reasons
why states to decide to comply, or not comply, with international law), with Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, The Persistent Problem of Obligation in International Law,
36 STAN. J. INT’L L. 271, 274 (2000) (analyzing the legal obligation of states to
comply with international law).
30. Compare Oona Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated
Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 473-74 (2005) (suggesting
many countries commit to international treaties primarily to increase their international reputation), with Dinah Shelton, Law, Non-Law and the Problem of ‘Soft
Law’, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 7-23 (Oxford U. Press, 2000) (highlighting
states’ reluctance to sign treaties with binding legal obligations).
31. Cf. Eric A. Posner, Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International Law?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1901, 1919 (2002-2003) (critiquing the moral obligation theory, and suggesting states’ compliance is based on “prudential behavior”).
32. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 115
U.N.T.S. 331 (incorporating the concept expressly in the Vienna Convention).
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process. It would be highly inappropriate to now critique the Principles as not having met the aspirations or considered the pressing
challenges of the developing countries. It would be also incongruous
to now determine that after participating in the events that led to the
drafting of the Principles and their subsequent ratification by the
Human Rights Council, states can now decide not to implement the
provisions of the Guiding Principles.
Numerous reasons account for States’ compliance with norms.
Harold Koh identifies five reasons: coercion, self-interest, legitimacy, communitarianism, and discursive legal process. 33 Burgstar on
his part identifies three reasons: first, actor fears punishment of rule
enforcers, second, the actor sees the rule as its own self-interest, and
third, the actor feels the rule is legitimate and ought to be obeyed. 34
Two issues are common to these conjectures: self-interest and legitimacy. Bursgtar’s first assumption is hinged on the social choice theory that people have to obey laws because the causative value of
non-compliance far outweighs the benefits of complying. What then
is self-interest in the terms of complying with norms? MNCs find it
easy to defy international norms because the best punishment they
can get is sanctions. Over time, sanctions have proven not to be a
very potent weapon in coercing MNCs to comply with norms, especially when such MNCs wield strong influential powers on States.
States that refuse to comply with commitments under an agreement could risk the possibility of making future commitments with
other States. States value their sovereignty and by extension their
reputation in the comity of nations. They would not want to mortgage their future by the actions they take today. States will therefore
hesitate before compromising that reputation. 35 This goes beyond the
political leadership at any particular point in time. The reputational
damage, once done, lives with the country for decades. The violation
of any agreement, binding or non-binding, must carry severe reputational costs if one thinks of the future effect of non-compliance. 36 It
33. See Harold Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law
Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 623-34 (1998-1999).
34. See Markus Burgstaller, Amenities and Pitfalls of a Reputational Theory of
Compliance with International Law, 76 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 39, 47 (2007).
35. Guzman, supra note 29, at 1849 (considering the level of reputational
harm a state will receive if it violates international law).
36. See Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic
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is in the light of the foregoing that this article argues that the Ruggie
Framework places greater burden on the states in implementing human rights norm. This may result in a change in behavior for the
states. Unfortunately, weak states are not eager to have this change in
behavior due to benefits from corruption and non-existent institutional mechanisms.

III.THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
AGENDA: RENEWED FOCUS
A. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES:
MATTERS ARISING
Ruggie’s task was basically to: identify and clarify standards of
corporate responsibility and accountability regarding human rights;
elaborate on states’ roles in regulating and adjudicating corporate activities; clarify concepts such as ‘complicity’ and sphere of influence; develop methodologies for human rights impact assessments;
and consider state and corporate best practices. 37 The SRSG, after
wide spread consultations, eventually drafted the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (“GP”). 38 On June 16, 2011,
the United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 17/4, en-

Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1577-1601 (2000) (stating
that obeying a norm imposes direct costs and conveys the reputational benefits, as
well as the benefit of avoiding sanctions).
37. Human Rights Council Res. 2005/69 (April 20, 2015). The Ruggie
Framework refers to the Framework proposed by the Special Representative of the
UN Secretary General (SRSG), Prof. John Ruggie, which encourages all non-state
actors to mainstream human right norms into their areas of activities.
38. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Office of the High Comm’r, Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect
and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc HR/PUB/11/04 (2011) [hereinafter Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework] (creating
the first global standard for mitigating and remediating the adverse effects of human rights violation linked to business activities; see also KENAN INSTITUTE FOR
ETHICS AT DUKE UNIVERSITY, The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights: Analysis and Implementation (2012), https://kenan.ethics.duke.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2012/07/UN-Guiding-Principles-on-Business-and-Human-RightsAnalysis-and-Implementation.pdf (discussing new issues that have arisen since the
implementation of the Guiding Principles and opportunities to further the Principles, as well as discussion regarding the implementation of the Guiding Principles).
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dorsed the GP for implementing the UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework. 39
Implementation has become a challenge for developing countries
due to corruption, administrative ineptitude, the need to attract foreign direct investment, weak implementation of the laws in existence, and a dearth of laws that can contend with the developments
and dynamics of globalization. 40 Furthermore, host states are unwilling to access the remedies available under their laws due to the negative effect it could have on the MNCs and tendency to protect free
flow of investments. Developing countries thus live under the impression that any act inimical to the progress of MNCs will see them
leave their country since the dictates of globalization permits them to
do so. 41 The question therefore is: who should bear responsibility for
social responsibility?
Several authors have recently proposed legally binding instruments to be complied with by the MNCs. According to this latest
voice, the aim is “to provide appropriate protection, justice and remedy to the victims of human rights abuses directly resulting from or
related to the activities of some transnational corporations and other
business enterprises.” 42 As a form of endorsement to this, the UN
Human Rights Council called for the drafting of a binding instrument
39. UN General Assembly Resolution A/HRC/RES/17/4, Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, (6 July 2011). [33rd
meeting, 16 June 2011, Adopted without a vote]. https://businesshumanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/un-human-rights-councilresolution-re-human-rights-transnational-corps-eng-6-jul-2011.pdf
(last visited
March 7, 2017).
40. E.g., Oil Pipelines Act (2004) Cap. (O7), § 11(5) (Nigeria) (exemplifying
that national laws provide remedies for individuals, however, these are the provision that states fail to implement).
41. See Erin Elizabeth Macek, Scratching the Corporate Back: Why Corporations Have No Incentive to Define Human Rights, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 101,
104-05 (2002) (stating that “a corporation’s wealth translates into power in a global economy”). But see PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND
THE LAW 105 (Oxford U. Press, 2d ed. 2007) (comparing the dependency theory
with the bargaining theory, and suggesting that under the bargaining theory states
may have more bargaining power with multinational corporations).
42. Statement on behalf of a Group of Countries at the 24rd Session of the
Human Rights Council, BUS. HUM. RTS. (Sept. 2013), http://businesshumanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/statement-unhrc-legallybinding.pdf [hereinafter Statement at the 24rd Session of the Human Rights Council].
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on business and human rights. 43 The call for this mandatory regime
has created a vacuum in the operational culture of the MNCs, they
are, therefore, left with a choice either to comply with mandatory
norms or seize the hitherto socially responsible projects they have
embarked upon. These gaps and the high incidents of human rights
violations resulting from unconscionable contractual bargains have
further increased the calls for a more transparent, accountable, and
human rights based approach to mitigation of human rights violation. 44
African leaders must craft pragmatic measures to address the
teething problems facing the African continent. As discussed earlier,
the lessons of Ogoni do not seem to reverberate in addressing the social and environmental malaise of the continent. The African Mining
Vision prides itself as a developmental mining approach that streamlines social linkages to benefit the continent. 45 We seem to have forgotten rather too quickly that it was in the bid to build economic and
social linkage to Nigeria’s development through unregulated business practices that resulted in the disastrous testing of drugs on some
children in Kano by Pfizer. 46 In that case, Pfizer claimed to have responded to an emergency, the outbreak of bacterial meningitis, measles, and cholera. The medical professionals who operated during
this period claimed that children were camped in filthy conditions in
hospitals lacking electricity and adequate water. 47 Yet Pfizer only
claimed to be doing CSR, albeit in an uncontrolled manner. 48
When Africa says it needs intervention, without manifest determi-

43. See Human Rights Council Res. 26/9 (June 26, 2014).
44. Ibironke T. Odumosu-Ayanu, Governments, Investors and Local Communities: Analysis of a Multi-Actor Investment Contract Framework, 15 MELB. J.
INT’L L. 473 (2014); see generally James Thuo Gathii, Incorporating the Third
Party Beneficiary Principle in Natural Resource Contracts, 43 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 93 (2014-2015) (proposing that the Third Party Beneficiary Principle
should be recognized and applied in contracts between developing countries and
MNCs to create proper standing for violations).
45. See African Mining Vision, About AMV, U.N. ECONOMIC COMMISSION
FOR AFRICA http://www.africaminingvision.org/about.html (providing the African
Mining Vision’s mission and purpose).
46. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16126, at *3-14
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005).
47. Id. at *3-16.
48. See id. at *43-52.
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nation to solve its problems, the continent will continue to be treated
as a child that needs to be helped consistently. From Zimbabwe’s
president that has refused to leave office despite plunging the country
into chaos and economic misery, to the case of the DRC earlier mentioned, the continent will only continue to succumb to the Global
North’s perception of an infantile continent bogged down by outlandish dogma. In any case, it has not been all bad news for Africa,
though, as Botswana has shown a remarkable improvement from its
shackles of imperialist dogma to show how to manage resources effectively. Botswana has one of the highest economic growth rates
since independence. Botswana’s economy depends on mineral resources. 49 Through fiscal discipline and sound economic management, Botswana has transformed itself from one of the poorest countries in the world to a middle-income country with a per capita GDP
of $16,900 in 2016. 50 Where MNCs are interested in mining, they
must follow the terms laid down by the host country. Such terms
must also have the input of the citizens through local community participation. Mining rights should belong to the indigenous people. If
this is the case, most litigants that would flood the courts would be
the MNCs as against the local community. The tide should change
now. This was the situation in Bolivia when the President announced
the intent to re-nationalize the Bolivian hydrocarbon assets. 51 Local
laws must be enforced and the rights of indigenous peoples guaranteed. The solution to Africa’s problem lies and belongs to Africa. After years of colonization, infrastructural development has declined
tremendously, a form of neo-colonization is entrenched. Favoritism
and nepotism has become the order of the day, while corruption is
growing geometrically. Scholarship should be devoted more to ascertain concerns about Africa’s denial of self-responsibility, still at an
infantile state, rather than begging favors from the international
community often.

49. See The World Facebook: Africa: Botswana, CIA (2017),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bc.html (stating
that diamond mining “accounts for one quarter of GDP, approximately 85% of export earnings”).
50. Id.
51. See Push for New Bolivia Constitution, BBC NEWS (Aug. 6, 2006),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5251306.stm (stating the purpose of the new
constitution was to give “more power to the indigenous majority”).
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IV.LOCAL COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN
RESOURCE GOVERNANCE
A. DIALECTICS OF NATURAL RESOURCE EXPLORATION IN
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES VIS-À-VIS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
While the developed societies have done fairly well in managing
their resources, developing countries continue to grapple with the
challenges of resource development in the face of huge financial incentives from MNCs. Global and national efforts are needed to limit
excessive misuse of natural resources in developing countries. Most
weak economies lower human rights standards so that MNCs can operate in their countries. Short-term gains in these countries are illusory and undermine longer term recovery. 52 The long and uncontrolled
governance gaps embolden MNCs to operate without sanctions or
caution.
Extractive industries do not provide effective complaints mechanisms for grievances related to their activities. This results in the inability of communities affected by their operations to seek for justice
at the local level in the first instance. Resource wealth in Africa,
where not efficiently managed, can lead to unstable growth, macroeconomic instability, 53 high rates of unemployment, poverty, inequality, 54 environmental degradation, resource-related conflicts, 55 and entrenched corruption. 56 The so-called ‘resource curse’ theory captures
52. See Paul Stevens & Evelyn Dietsche, Resource curse: An Analysis of
causes, experiences and possible ways forward, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 56, 58 (2008)
(explaining that the current GDP rebasing of the Nigerian economy and the indicators from other resource-rich African countries does not support the argument that
natural resources contribute to the development of a nation as evident in developed
nations).
53. E.g., Carolyn Jenkins, Growth, Capital Accumulation, and Economic Reform in South Africa, in RESOURCE ABUNDANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
239, 240-42 (R.M. Auty ed., Oxford U. Press 2001) (describing South Africa’s decelerate economic growth).
54. See Michael L. Ross, How Mineral-Rich States Can Reduce Inequality, in
ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE 249, 252 (Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D.
Sachs, & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., Colum. U. Press 2007) (highlighting vertical inequality in mineral-resource rich countries).
55. See Paul Collier & Anke Hoefler, On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa,
46.1 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 13, 16-17 (2002) (analyzing the connection countries that
export primary commodities and the risk of conflict).
56. See Terry Lynn Karl, Ensuring Fairness: The Case of a Transparent Fis-
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these ill effects of resource-dependence in developing countries. 57 In
contrast, developed countries have demonstrated the capacity to implement and enforce their laws and policies and engage local communities in the extraction of natural resources. 58 A former Halliburton executive, Albert Stanley is currently serving a two-and-a-halfyear jail term after he pled guilty in a US federal court to orchestrating a $180 million bribery scheme to secure $6 billion in natural gas
deals in Nigeria. 59 The investigation of the bribes traversed four continents (Europe, US, Japan, and Nigeria) over the period of ten years
and involved five companies in this countries. 60 Criminal and civil
penalties in the case have yielded more than $1.7 billion in fines, forfeitures and other sanctions. 61 In Nigeria, where the contract and
bribery took place, investigations have been shrouded in secrecy.
Nobody has been prosecuted and the citizens continue to wallow in

cal Social Contract, in ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE 256, 266 (Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs, & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., Colum. U. Press 2007) (noting
the lack of transparency when governments are connected to oil extraction). But
see Botswana: 2009-2013 Country Strategy Paper, AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
12 (2009), https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-andOperations/BOTSWANA_2009%20%E2%80%93%202013%20COUNTRY%20STRAT
EGY%20PAPER.pdf (stating that “as a result of this solid economic management
and low levels of corruption (see Section 2), Botswana has earned consistently
high credit ratings from rating agencies”).
57. The resource curse refers to a situation where resource-dependent countries grow slowly, lack economic diversification, suffer from environmental degradation, experience corruption, undergo violent conflict, and local communities,
mainly indigenous peoples and women, do not fully participate in decisionmaking. See generally Humphreys et al., Introduction: What is the Problem with
Natural Resource Wealth, in ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE 1 (Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs, & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., Colum. U. Press 2007) (explaining the phenomenon of the resource curse).
58. Cf. Lee Godden et al., Accommodating Interests in Resource Extraction:
Indigenous Peoples, Local Communities, and the Role of Law in Economic and
Social Sustainability, 26.1 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCE L. 1, 3, 9-10 (2008) (presenting evidence of key themes which help accommodate indigenous interests in
relation to resources).
59. John Rudolf, Robert Stanley, Former Halliburton Exec, Sentenced in Bribery
Scheme,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Feb.
24,
2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/24/albert-stanley-halliburton-kbr-briberysentence_n_1299760.html (reporting on the investigation and Halliburton’s sentence).
60. See id.
61. See id.

ABE ACTUALLY FOR PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

914

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

4/30/2017 2:46 PM

[32:4

abject poverty. Yet, it is these same international communities that a
country like Nigeria runs to for help in mitigating, addressing and
remediating human rights standards. Still in the US, the CEO of a
mining company in West Virginia is headed to jail for a mine accident that claimed ten miners lives. 62 Likewise, the CEO of a power
company in North Carolina is in trouble for releasing coal ash into
ecosystems in the area. 63 There is no hard-fast rule to achieving extractive resource governance other than enforcing laws and setting a
precedent to deter future governance gap evident in this industry.

B. INCORPORATION OF LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN EXTRACTIVE
RESOURCE GOVERNANCE
1. Court Assisted Process
One would have expected that potential litigants from low-income
countries would find succor in the courts in enforcing their fundamental human rights. For example, the court systems in Nigeria and
South Africa are not sufficiently equipped to entertain disputes arising from multijurisdictional or transnational contracts signed by investors and states. 64 While the judges may not be versed in the dynamics surrounding that type of system, most court systems in the
Global South do not have the expertise to handle such conflicts.
Apart from corruption, litigants, mostly indigenous people do not
have the financial capability to prosecute their case. What difference

62. See Alan Blinder, Mixed Verdict for Donald Blankenship, Ex-Chief of
Massey Energy, After Coal Mine Blast, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3. 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/us/donald-blankenship-massey-energyupper-big-branch-mine.html?_r=0 (describing the charges brought against the CEO
and its unprecedented nature).
63. See Case Summary: Duke Energy Agrees to $3 Million Cleanup for Coal
Ash Release in the Dan River, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/casesummary-duke-energy-agrees-3-million-cleanup-coal-ash-release-dan-river (last
visited Jan. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Case Summary: Dan River] (providing information about the Eden Ash Spill, the power company and the fine imposed against
the company by the environmental protection agency).
64. Ruth Hopkins, Broken Beyond Imagination: South Africa’s Justice System, DAILY MAVERICK (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/
2014-04-14-broken-beyond-imagination-south-africas-justice-system/#.Whwe
BFUrLIU; see Assessment of the Integrity and Capacity of the Justice System in
Three Nigerian States, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME 161-62 (Jan. 2006) (highlighting the fact that the Nigerian law is silent on the validity of contracts).
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would it make in a country such as Nigeria where there is no theoretical sophistication or philosophical dimension on the bench, where
techniques rules and judges are all too dominated by a crude Austenian legal positivist jurisprudence! What is the imaginativeness required to understand standing in a way that would make even the
Ruggie Principles slightly meaningful? To avert this disaster, Litigants thence find themselves caught up between ineffective judicial
system and continued violation of their human rights by MNCs. To
escape this dilemma, some litigants have approached courts in the
Global North to enforce their human rights. 65
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 66 the U.S. Supreme Court
regrettably held that corporations are immune from tort liability for
violations of the law of nations such as torture, genocide or extra judicial killings. Since corporate liability has not attained a discernible,
much less universal acceptance among nations of the world, it cannot
form the basis of a suit under the Alien Tort Statute. Thankfully, in
Doe v. Nestle USA INC, 67 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the ninth circuit overturned an earlier order in the case which had dismissed the
plaintiff’s case brought under the Alien Tort Statute. The action was
brought by former child soldiers who were forced to harvest cocoa in
the Ivory Coast. 68 They alleged that the defendant corporations aided
and abetted child slavery by providing assistance to Ivorian farmers. 69 Though the court found that there was no categorical rule of
corporate immunity or liability, courts can look to international law
and determine whether corporations are subject to the norms underlying that claim. 70 The court therefore took the view that the prohibition against slavery was universal and could be asserted against corporate defendants in this case. 71 Interestingly, the court concluded
that the plaintiff’s allegations satisfied the more stringent “purpose”
65. E.g., Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
(holding a cause of action was not adequately plead under the Alien Tort Act by
Malians children who were forced to work in labor camps in Cote d’Ivoire).
66. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013).
67. Doe v. Nestle USA, Inc., 738 F.3d 1048, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding
“corporations can face liability for claims brought under the Alien Tort Statute”)
withdraw, Doe I v. Nestle USA, 766 F.3d. 1013, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 2014).
68. See Doe I v. Nestle USA, 766 F.3d at 1016-17.
69. See id. at 1017.
70. See id. at 1018, 1020.
71. See id. at 1022.
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standard by suggesting that a myopic focus on profit over human
welfare drove the defendants to act with the purpose of obtaining the
cheapest cocoa possible, even it meant facilitating child slavery. 72
This was a grand opportunity the Supreme Court lost in the Kiobel
case to address the issue of corporate liability under international
law. This is however a welcome development. Cases such as this will
no doubt drive the business and human rights agenda positively forward.
The issue of environmental pollution and guerrilla warfare in mineral resource rich zones are issues of humanitarian tragedy. The effects of climate change and conflicts are issues wide and extensive
literature has covered. Hundreds of thousands of innocent lives have
been lost as a result of extraction of natural resources from these
zones. 73 Besides moral implications, the thinking that companies are
only out there to make profits must have found nauseating implication in the minds of the judges as they referred to that idea as “myopic.” 74
The unfathomable thinking is that some firms believe that respect
for human rights norms would inhibit global trade and development.
In the United States, for instance, the Bush and Obama administrations fought relentlessly against the application of the Alien Tort
Statute to cases of human rights violations abroad. 75 Their argument
was that such suits in federal courts raise serious foreign policy concerns. 76 The amicus briefs filed by the US governments in the Kiobel
Case was on the basis that the courts, by entertaining these cases,
72. See id. at 1024-26 (refusing to decide whether the purpose or knowledge is
the appropriated standard to assess aiding and abetting, but agreeing that this was
egregious enough that would have satisfied the heightened purpose standard).
73. See, e.g., Patrick MacNeill, Overview of the Project Undertaken at the
NSW Department of Primary Industries as a Vacation Industrial Work Experience
Project, INT’L MINING FATALITY DATABASE 21-23 (2008) (charting the number of
fatalities experiences in various countries due to coal mine accidents).
74. Doe I v. Nestle USA, 766 F.3d at 1026.
75. See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl et al., The Alien Tort Claims Act Under Attack,
98 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 49, 51 (2004); Jack Goldsmith, The Contributions of the
Obama Administration to the Practice and Theory of International Law, 57.2
HARV. INT’L L.J. 1,4 (2016) (discussing the Obama administration’s stance on various international issues).
76. See Drumbl et al., supra note 75, at 51 (citing the Bush administration as
claiming the lawsuits would “threaten to bankrupt the world economy and seriously impede the conduct of foreign relations”).
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were acting inconsistently with the US foreign policy of promoting
US investors abroad. 77 Thus, the argument that human rights rules
are in conflict with development needs to be rejected at the earliest
stage.
The primary duty to protect human rights falls on the state. However, in the DRC case highlighted above, the state is not and has
never been present. 78 The resources are controlled by guerillas. Business is still ongoing, and minerals are extracted and exported from
the country. Cell phones are churned out in large quantities and the
by-products of these properties are from minerals extracted mostly
from these weak zones. 79 If states are solely charged with human
rights obligations, and the duty of due diligence falls on them, how
do we ensure that the government of DRC has due diligence obligations to make sure those violations which are occurring in those
places are attributable to the state? There are lots of problems in
weak governance zones. Notably, bad actors who are mostly nonstate armed groups.
Ruggies Principles reproduces the distinction between voluntary
and binding initiatives. It creates a responsibility which rethinks how
businesses should approach human rights. 80 The problem with these
rules is not that they are inadequate. It is a problem of enforcement.
For instance, Nigeria has numerous rules and regulations on the best
practices for managing the extraction of natural resources. However,
77. See Brief for Respondent at 25-31, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2011) (No. 10-1491), 2011 WL 6425363, at 25-31 [hereinafter
Kiobel Brief].
78. See Gentleman, supra note 7 (“The justice system and the military still
barely function, and United Nations officials say Congolese government troops are
among the worst offenders when it comes to rape. Large swaths of the country . . .
remain authority-free zones where civilians are at the mercy of heavily armed
groups.”).
79. See Cell Phone Mineral Answer Key, MINERALS EDUCATION COALITION
(2013)
https://mineralseducationcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/10_9_13cell
phoneanswer.pdf (providing charts of the major mineral used to produce cell
phones and the leading countries exporting those minerals).
80. See generally John Ruggie, Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/17/31, annex I, ¶¶ 1-15 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Ruggie, Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights] (listing and explaining the general
principals).
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these rules are only good on paper. The enforcement regime is either
deficient or nonexistent. Apart from strengthening local institutions
charged with domestic implementation and enforcement of these
laws, what should be emphasized is that if an MNC goes to these
weak zones, the mere fact that host countries do not enforce their
laws should not be an avenue to aid and abet corrupt governments or
turn a blind eye to human rights enforcements. MNCs should not disregard these rules and principles. If these principles applied to the
MNCs, the notorious Ogoni and Marikana disasters would not have
occurred. In effect, therefore, if Nigerian government is violating the
rights of indigenous peoples of the Niger-Delta, MNCs should not be
complicit. This connivance should also extend to third parties directly responsible to the MNCs. This would erode the application of separate legal personality principle usually used by the MNCs to avoid
liability. For example, an MNC employs the services of state funded
security forces to protect its installations. In the process of protection, these forces become involved in human rights violations in the
local community. It will be incongruous for the MNC to deny responsibility but instead allocate liability to the state as objects and
those with sole obligation to protect human rights under international
law. This raises some complications under domestic law. Although
the Supreme Court dodged the question of corporate liability for the
acts of third parties in the Kiobel case, drawing the nexus in that relationship is necessary in building the case for liability against
MNCs. 81 This the court did successfully so far in Doe v. Nestle USA,
INC. 82
2. The Third-Party Beneficiary Rule
Another way of incorporating legal frameworks in extractive resource governance is through the Third-Party Beneficiary Rule
(TPBR). Contract law provides reciprocal responsibilities between

81. See Kiobel, supra note 66.
82. Doe v. Nestle USA, Inc., 738 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing the
Second Circuit in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582
F.3d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2009) which held that ‘‘a defendant may
be held liable under international law for aiding and abetting the violation of that
law by another when the defendant (1) provides practical assistance to the principal
which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime, and (2) does so with
the purpose of facilitating the commission of that crime’’).
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both parties. Any party that is not privy to any contractual relationship is not expected to enjoy benefits derivable from the contract.
The reason for this is simple. Promises exchanged between consenting people are meant to be carried out in good faith between those
two people. Where one fulfills his obligations and the other does not,
a breach of the contract has occurred. This gives rise to repudiation
of the contract or other remedies available in contract law. 83 Contractual bargain therefore enhances the wealth of the contracting parties as it creates value through exchange and allowing the contracting
parties to make reliable plans. 84 This invariably formed the basis for
what has now been widely accepted as the doctrine of privity of contract. 85
Under the TPBR, a third person, not a party to the contract can sue
to enforce a promise made for his or her benefit under the contract,
though he was not a party to the contract. 86 In the United States, the
83. See, e.g., GREG ABBOTT & DOUG COULSON, BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL
LITIGATION § 19:172 (Tex. Prac. Guide 2016-2017); see generally David Campbell, Better than Fuller: A Two Interests Model of Remedies for Breach of Contract, 78 MOD. L. REV. 296 (2015) (arguing the restitution interest should be eliminated as contract remedy); Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of
Contract, 70 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1145 (1970) (providing remedies obtainable under
contract law).
84. See, e.g., Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits,
95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 743-44 (1982) (discussing the benefits of bargaining); cf.
Robert Cooter & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73
CAL. L. REV. 1432, 1459-64 (1985) (explaining how various remedies act as incentives to perform the contract).
85. See Jesse W. Lilienthal, Privity of Contract, 1 HARV. L. REV. 226, 226-32
(1887) (quoting Lake Ontario Shore Railroad Co. v. Curtiss, 80 N.Y. 219 (1880),
“The general rule is, that when two persons, for a consideration sufficient as between themselves, covenant to do some act, which if done would incidentally result in the benefit of a mere stranger, that stranger has not a right to enforce the
covenant, although one of the contracting parties might enforce it as against the
other”).
86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (Am. Law Inst. 1981)
(noting “parties to a contract have the power, if they so intend, to create a right in a
third party”); see also Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study
of the Third Party Beneficiary R., 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1111-12 (1985) (stating
that a third party’s ability to enforce a contract is a well-accepted concept in the
United States); cf. Marissa Marco, Accountability in International Project Finance: The Equator Principles and the Creation of Third-Party-Beneficiary Status
for Project-Affected Communities, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 452, 455 (2011) (suggesting the Equator Principles should adopt the concept of third-party-beneficiary
interests in order for communities to ensure compliance with the Equator Princi-
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TPBR has been applied in a number of cases. 87 There is growing and
emerging literature on this principle. What is important from the literature is the intention of the parties as at the time the contract was
negotiated. Extractive resource contracts between the states and investors are for the exploration of natural resources within the State.
Modern approach to the TPBR tends towards the applicability of
the rule to resource extraction projects. This is evident in low income countries, particularly in Africa where landed property and
natural resources belong to the State, though the State holds it in trust
for use to the benefit of the people. 88 Gathii’s seminal work on this
rule four reasons why the TPBR should be applied to resource extraction contracts. 89 His most important reason is that the rule is consistent with the wishes of the parties to the contract, though, he
claims that this right of a third party is remedial and not substantive. 90
Strictly, the application of the Rule goes beyond the mere intention of the parties. 91 An extractive resource contract entered into beples by MNCs).
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (providing for the
recognition of the third party principle); see also Dutton v. Poole (1678) 83 Eng.
Rep. 523 (K.B.) (finding a third party to be privy to the contract because she was
the intended beneficiary); see also Maneely v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 623 (1929)
(holding the plaintiff was an intended third-party beneficiary and was allowed to
bring a claim for damages).
88. See Land Use Act (1990) § 1, ch. 202 (Nigeria); see also Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act of 2002, GG 23922, § 2 (10 Oct. 2002); see
also Petroleum Exploration and Production Law (1984), § 1 (Ghana); see also
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA, (1996), § 257(6) (Ghana).
89. See Gathii, supra note 44, at 114 (stating his four reasons that the TPBR is
consistent with resource extraction are: (1) third party wishes are consistent with
the wishes of the parties to the contract; (2) resource contracts are made for the
benefit of the public; (3) it is necessary on the grounds of justice and mortality; and
(4) it is essential on public policy grounds).
90. See, e.g., Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note
38, at ¶¶ 25.
91. See Olson v. Etheridge, 686 N.E.2d 563, 569 (Ill. 1997) (adopting a modern view on the duty of a beneficiary to a contract, the Court held that thirdparty beneficiaries to a contract only obtain vested rights in a contract when one of
the three vesting circumstances set forth in section 311(3) Restatement (second) of
Contracts is satisfied); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358, 1378 (1992) (suggesting “intent” is ambiguous and is not
clearly defined); cf. Patience A. Crowder, More Than Merely Incidental: ThirdParty Beneficiary Rights in Urban Redevelopment Contracts, 17 GEO. J. ON
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tween government and investors which does not have the input of local communities does not deserve the consideration of an academic
critique. Local communities are ultimate beneficiaries of State projects. Due to the insensitivity of governments in the past, there have
been high levels of distrust between local communities, governments
and investors. However, throughout the planning, decision making,
execution and implementation stages of the various projects, local
communities were not aware of these projects. They have no sufficient participatory rights, likewise, their enforceable rights are limited. Without entrenched local community participation in natural resource contract, the TPBR will be a mere charade.
A new approach is thus suggested, which should mandate MNC to
enter into contractual relationships with local communities through
enforceable Memorandums of Understanding instead of the State. In
the alternative, where they enter into contractual relationship with the
State, there must be an incidental contractual relationship with the
local community. It is in this context it can truly be said that the Rule
has the intention of the citizens at heart. The rule will thence enjoy
the concept of ‘free, prior and informed consent’ that is key to
achieving the participatory development right under the United Nations. In Canada, the indigenous populations known as First Nations
are always consulted before any project in their locality is done. 92
African states must adapt this practice to their various local communities.
Further, indigenous peoples have historically been cut off from
any decisions that affect them. They thus become vulnerable, suffering from a lack of political representation and decision making concerning matters that affects them. 93 Even though these contracts conPOVERTY L. & POL’Y 287, 287 (2010) (noting “community groups that seek to become involved in city-sponsored redevelopment projects have limited avenues of
participation from which to choose” and need to rely on the third-party beneficiary,
even when their intention is different than the contracting parties).
92. See Consulting with First Nations, BRITISH COLUMBIA (last accessed Feb.
11, 2017), http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/environment/natural-resourcestewardship/consulting-with-first-nations (requiring consultation on “land and resource decision that could impact their aboriginal interests”).
93. See Phillipe Hanna & Frank Vanclay, Indigenous Peoples and the Concept
of Free, Prior and Informed Consent, 31 IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND PROJECT
APPRAISAL 146, 152 (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14615517.2013.780373
(noting the implementation of free, prior and informed consent can create illusion
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form to the wishes of the people, practically, the implementation is
weak. If indigenous communities had been involved in the planning
and execution of the contract, the enforcement of TPBR would have
been easily implementable and naturally enforceable on the MNCs. 94
In adducing evidence in support of this assertion, Gathii claims that
the financial resources obtained from investors through the contracts
are used towards public projects, such as roads, or for paying for
public education and health. 95 As much as this is theoretically applicable, the reverse is the case in local communities where resources
are extracted. This has been the bane of failed CSR. Laws do not
cure all of the social ills occasioned by globalization and the insatiable quest for industrialization. The firm is not only a legal creation,
but a moral compass with social and ethical responsibilities that extend to shareholders and other constituents in a state, including the
local communities. 96 The obligation of business is to consider,
weigh, and balance the needs of the firm’s stakeholders 97 Due to
moral imperatives, a corporation must be able to balance these obligations in a way that puts emphasis on the society. It is an undeniable
fact that government representation of local communities, especially
when it has to do with resource extraction projects, is often ludicrous
due to lack of capacity, lack of interest or conflict of interest. 98 Evidence suggests that due to high level of corruption and weak governit is being achieved, but in reality, excludes many community members from participating in decision-making); see generally S. Mahanty, C.L. McDermott, ‘How
does ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent’ (FPIC) Impact Social Equity? Lessons
from Mining and Forestry and Their Implications for REDD+’, 35 LAND USE
POLICY 406, (2013) (examining how the principle of “free, prior, and informed
consent” has impacted social equality and why).
94. Cf. George (Rock) Pring & Susan Y. Noe, The Emerging International
Law of Public Participation Affecting Global Mining, Energy, and Resources Development, in DONALD M. ZILLMAN, ET. AL., HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATURAL
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT OF MINING AND ENERGY RESOURCES 59-64 (Oxford Univ. Press
2002) (discussing the necessity of including the indigenous community’s participation in decision).
95. See Gathii, supra note 44, at 116.
96. See, e.g., LUO YADONG, GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 198-99 (Blackwell Publishing 2007) (highlighting that a corporate’s
social responsibility is an ethical duty).
97. See id.
98. See Odumosu-Ayanu, supra note 44, at 478 (suggesting international
standing exists and may be the best source of a legal resolution).
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ance mechanisms, most constituent units of the federal republic enter
into public-private initiatives in a way to indirectly expand infrastructural developments in their space. 99
If a government truly enters into contracts on behalf of its people,
then they should be direct beneficiaries of the proceeds of the contracts. Accordingly, they should be allowed to sue on the contract.
After all, the issue of permanent sovereignty over natural resources
lies with the people and not the government per se. 100 Article 21(1)
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, 101 guarantees
the right of all peoples to freely dispose of their wealth and natural
resources. 102 This right is to be exercised in the exclusive interest of
the people. 103 This right is for the benefit of the people and it has to
be exercised on behalf of the people. What this argument portends
for Nigeria is that a people-centered agreement between MNCs and
government that would drastically endanger the environment, citizenry or communities are open to possible censure 104. This point proceeds on the recognition that sustainable exploitation of the environment takes cognizance of the rights of future generations yet
unborn.
99. Lagos is one of the 36 states in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It is a
cosmopolitan State and as such, there has been a pressure to develop the States infrastructure. Even in the face of federal governments neglect. The State has been
able to pursue giant strides. See Lagos Denies Terminating Controversial Concession Deal On Lekki-Epe Highway, WILL NEWSPAPER (Aug. 28, 2013),
http://thewillnigeria.com/news/lagos-denies-terminating-controversial-concessiondeal-on-lekki-epe-highway/ (accessed 11 August, 2016) (providing the text of a
press release regarding the deal from the Lagos government).
100. See G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (Dec. 14, 1962); see also Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and
Peoples’ Ownership of Natural Resources in International Law, 38 GEO. WASH.
INT’L L. REV. 33, 66-67 (2006) (arguing that natural resource extraction should be
at the benefit of the citizens of the nation).
101. Org. of African Unity [OAU], African Charter on Human and People’s
Rights (Banjul Charter), art. 21(1), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58
(1982) (June 27, 1981), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3630.html [hereinafter Banjul Charter].
102. See id. at art. 21(1).
103. See id.
104. See Abegunde, supra note 15, at 34 (stating that to avoid conflict and exploitation, the government, resource bearing community, natural resource workers,
and multinational corporations must all be in agreement about terms of contracts
and those terms must improve the living conditions of surrounding communities in
the present and future).
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Natural resource extraction activities in resource rich Global South
countries are riddled with woes and conflict. It is therefore not immediately clear how the rule will attract justice and morality in a
country such as Nigeria where value systems are deficient and corruption is the order of the day. Local communities lack interest in
development projects even in their community. This is due to long
years of deceit perpetrated by the government and insensitivity of the
MNCs. Even where judgments are given, who bears the burden of
enforcement particularly where the judgment is against the government? 105 The state has failed over the years and the institutional reforms needed have never been done and where it did, it never
worked. Where the right institutions are put in place, practice will
merge with theory. Furthermore, the socio-political, historical and
economic history of the indigenous peoples contributes to the regime
of non-inclusivity. Indigenous people must actively participate in the
realization of their right to development. 106
3. Community Development Agreements
Contracts are meant to be sacrosanct. The terms of any legally
agreed contract must be complied with, exceptions being unconscionable bargain or such agreements did not meet the thresholds of
a valid contract. 107 Community Development Agreements (CDAs)
constitute another genre of contract. 108 This type of agreement has
become important considering the debate about the possibility of
TPBR which would have been an exception to privity of contract.
This agreement involves investors and communities. Unlike con105. See, e.g., Gbemre (on behalf of Iwheraken Community, Delta State) v.
Shell Petroleum Dev. Corp. (2005) FHC/B/CS/53/05 21 (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (holding
that respondents were restrained from “further flaring of gas in applicants’ community and are to take immediate steps to stop the further flaring of gas in the applicants’ community”).
106. See G.A. Res. 41/128, ¶¶ 2-3 (Dec. 4, 1986) (providing that all individuals
in a community have a right to participate in development).
107. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 17-18, 20, 22, and
208 (showing that in most common law countries, for there to be a valid contract,
there must be offer, acceptance, consideration, intention to enter legal relations and
capacity to contract).
108. See Leland T. Saito, How Low Income Residents Can Benefit from Urban
Development: The LA Live Community Benefits Agreement, 11 CITY &
COMMUNITY 129, 130 (2012) (discussing Community Benefit Agreements and examining the CBA’s impact on addressing structural inequality).

ABE ACTUALLY FOR PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

UNTYING THE GORDIAN KNOT

4/30/2017 2:46 PM

925

tracts between investors and governments, which gives rise to TPBR,
this type of contract directly involves the community. Thus, the local
community is involved in contract making. Besides, when investors
enter into contract with government, they are legally allowed to carry
out their exploration activities in the local community. 109 While they
possess this legal license, they do not have the social license to operate, hence the frequent and heightened tension between the investors
and local communities. Social responsibility arises from social power. While it is true that MNCs may have the requisite legal basis for
conducting activities in the extractive industries in Nigeria and South
Africa, they certainly lack the social license to operate. This is evident in the Niger-Delta and Marikana incidents. 110 Firms have the
tremendous influence over governments especially when such powers extend to issues such as environment, community development
and human rights. 111 To avoid criminal or civil prosecution, managers must ensure their firms comply with relevant laws. By so doing,
they avoid distracting court cases, punitive fines, and distrust from
their host community.
In March 2015, France passed a law mandating big supermarkets
to sign contracts with a charity group to ensure donating food to
charities instead of destroying those food that were not sold. 112 The
pertinent question is why do we need a law for something that seems
logical? Since you do not use a product, give it to charity, you do not
make a profit on it. Perhaps, the supermarkets could argue that if
they give to charities for free, what they will not use again, though
still edible, this could discourage individuals to give to those charities that would want to buy again in their own supermarket. There is
something logical when making your business in the best way, looking for what is in your best interest. Those who therefore hold tenaciously to Friedman’s conception of the irrationality of CSR has lost
109. See id.
110. See Abegunde, supra note 15, at 32 (discussing the violent conflict of the
Ogoni people in the Niger Delta).
111. See Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 38, at
¶¶ 11, 13 (establishing that a business has the responsibility to respect human
rights, avoid causing or contributing to violations of human rights, and prevent or
mitigate any violations that are directly caused by its operations).
112. See, e.g., France to Ban Food Waste in Supermarkets, AL JAZEERA (May
22, 2015, 8:14 AM), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/france-food-wastesupermarkets-150522070410772.html.
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the deep meaning of evolution of ethical modernization which responsible firms are aligning with today.
For victims of human rights violations, a basis for empowerment,
participation in project execution and implementation and an avenue
for assessing governments and business conduct are necessary for
reversing the risks associated with resource exploitation. Some jurisdictions have taken a step further to ensure that CDAs are statutorily
provided for. 113 Contracts that take cognizance of the rights of the indigenous peoples, thereby giving them an opportunity to negotiate
terms of the contract, almost always have
the potential to integrate the main stakeholders within one framework,
address democratic deficits in the law and oil and gas regulation, allow
actors to negotiate interests, benefits and obligations, facilitate cordial relationships as well as responsibilities on the part of all the actors and the
stronger relationships in turn contribute to sustainable exploitation of resources and responsible management of project development. 114

Evidence lends support to the fact that negotiating CDAs has reversed negative impact of large projects which shows the disparities
in the economic and political resources controlled by investors and
local communities. 115 CDAs have the potential of addressing the interests of the local community. Even where the government through
its agencies and parastatals have the best of intentions, MNCs have
the capability to influence these officials so that they can subvert any
positive development impact on the community.
The West Africa Gas Pipeline project is an example that readily
comes to mind. It is a regional pipeline project that transmits gas
from Nigeria to Benin, Togo and Ghana. 116 Undoubtedly, this type of
project would lead to the destruction and/or relocation of properties.
It would also have the potential of destroying livelihoods, damaging
plantation and displacing residents from their homelands. The pro-

113. See Odumosu-Ayanu, supra note 44, at 491-92 (considering the effectiveness of domestic statutes and regulations).
114. Id. at 510.
115. See Saito, supra note 108, at 129.
116. See Treaty on the West African Gas Pipeline Project Between the Republic
of Benin, the Republic of Ghana, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and the Republic of Togo, Jan. 31, 2003, WAGP art. II(3) [hereinafter WAGP Treaty] (establishing the governance system of the pipeline).
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gram which started in 1982 was finally endorsed by the World Bank
in 1992 as a commercial and feasible project, capable of supplying
gas to the West African region. 117 The Heads of the four African
States signed an Agreement in 1995 and on August 11, 1999, a
Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the governments of
Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana. 118 In February 2000, an InterGovernmental Agreement was signed. 119 Furthermore, Clause 20.3
of the WAGP International Project Agreement provides that land
owners who are impacted by the activities of the Company or project
and lose their lands as a result will be entitled to “fair compensation
for disturbance or damage.” 120 This might not be a much needed legal empowerment for the local people, but it is a significant improvement from earlier practice where companies and States take
land from the natives without recourse to any form of compensation. 121

117. See, e.g., Ese Awhotu, Gains, Constraints of the $1.8 Billion West Africa
Gas
Pipeline
Project,
ALL
AFRICA
(Dec.
1,
2009),
http://allafrica.com/stories/200912020110.html (stating that there was some resistance to the project because of political and economic uncertainties, but the support of the World Bank helped the countries involved come to an agreement over
the project).
118. See WAGP Treaty, supra note 116, preamble.
119. See West African Gas Pipeline Act (2004) (681), § 13 (Ghana) (enacting a
law that domestics the gas pipeline and providing that “The Company shall pay to
any affected legitimate land owners or lawful occupiers of land entered pursuant to
the exercise of the rights of the license holder under section 12, fair compensation
for disturbance or damage caused by the activities of the Company or project contractors on such land”); see generally About the Pipeline, WAPCO,
http://wagpco.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=122&Itemid
=85 (providing details about the pipeline and it’s product).
120. WAGP Treaty, supra note 116, art. 13(1).
121. See, e.g., Natives Land Act 27 of 1913 § 10 (S. Afr.) (regulating the acquisition of land by the native black people and being used as a tool by the then repressive apartheid government to indicate that only certain areas of the country
could be owned by the natives, but it has been replaced by the current land reform
process which focuses on restitution, land tenure and land redistribution); see also
William G. Moseley & Brent McCusker, Fighting Fire with a Broken Tea Cup: A
Comparative Analysis of South Africa’s Land-Redistribution Program, 98(3)
GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 322, 324-25 (2008) (discussing the Native Land Act); see
also Klaus Deininger, Making Negotiated Land Reform Work: Initial Experience
from Colombia, Brazil and South Africa, 27 WORLD DEV. 651, 652-53 668 (1999).
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V. CONCLUSION
This article has considered various approaches aimed at ensuring
that the Guiding Principles assist improved extractive resource governance in the extractive sector. It has discussed problems that present obstacles against the implementation of the Guiding Principles
in the extractive resource industry in the Global South, particularly in
Sub-Saharan Africa. These include corruption, civil conflict, and authoritarianism. A consideration of the issues concerning corporate liability for human rights violations borders on awareness that the
companies should consider that they owe it a moral duty to abide by
human rights norms and laws. Some may argue that the main purpose of a company is to make profit. However, making profit does
not translate to hurting human beings or damaging their means of
livelihood. Where the activities of these MNCs would result in environmental degradation and violation of human rights, companies
must immediately remediate such acts. While the Global South
needs the cooperation of the Global North in development aid, countries in the Global South must show spirited efforts at addressing the
challenges that face them domestically. African states, for instance,
are managed by corrupt, inept and a cabal system. The citizens are
continually impoverished and increasingly violent?
States should be more concerned about both reputational and direct sanctions for their conduct. They have an obligation to protect
human rights by enforcing all human rights standards so as not to
breach their commitments under international law. Unfortunately,
UN treaties and Customary International Law do not provide for regulation of business enterprise. 122 Admittedly, the Guiding Principles
which guide corporate businesses, are not legally mandatory. A reputational theory, however, would label as international law any commitment that materially alters state incentives. 123 These commitments, allow us to understand the workings of international
obligations within a reputational theoretical framework. It explains

122. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1031 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (stating that the ICJ shall decide cases in accordance with international law, conventions, customs, and general principles of
law of civilized nations).
123. See Guzman, supra note 29, at 1825.
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why such agreements exist and why they are so popular. 124 Resolutions, declarations and agreements represent commitments by a state
which, if breached, will have a reputational impact. 125 With this in
the background, human rights principles will become naturally mandatory for the MNCs. The ultimate objective is to decrease the gap
between developed and developing countries in managing extractive
resources governance creditably. Local communities must be involved and adequately represented in planning, execution and implementation of resource extraction projects through either TPBR or
Impact Benefit Agreements. Increasing participation of local communities is key to the business and human rights agenda. No doubt,
Memorandum of Understanding and CDAs, as argued in this paper,
have the potential of addressing the interests of the local community.
Until we de-emphasize financial incentive as the goal of political
governance, turning resource wealth into improved standard of living
for the people will only be a mirage. Issues of weak enforcement of
rules and regulations, bad labor standards, environmental pollution,
corruption, and lack of political will must be aggressively addressed.
Hilson expresses the concern that most Sub-Saharan African countries encounter two major challenges which have impacted on their
growth trajectory. First, the timing to bring extractive industries to
fruition happened when the countries just attained independence.

124. See id.
125. The impact may even extend beyond the scope of the agreement. For example, the Basel Accord was negotiated and agreed to by the central bankers of
twelve countries in 1988. Although not a treaty and, as a result, not considered
binding under traditional definitions of international law, a central banker whose
country failed to supervise banking activity in a manner consistent with the Accord
would surely face a loss of influence in the international regulation of banking and
make it more difficult to enter into future negotiations. There is an incentive not to
promise too much and an encouragement to honor such agreements. Such agreements as this can change state behavior. The reputational cost of a failure to honor
the Basel Accord could easily extend beyond the banking arena. To the extent that
such action is perceived as a signal that a country does not take the promises of its
negotiators seriously in the absence of a formal international legal commitment,
such action could undermine all efforts to negotiate non-binding agreements. It
should be noted that those who negotiate these agreements on behalf of their countries have the authority to bring domestic regulations into compliance with the
agreements. See generally Duncan E. Alford, Basle Committee Minimum Standards: International Regulatory Response to the Failure of BCCI, 26 GEO. WASH. J.
INT’L L. & ECON. 241, 259 (1992).
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This significantly put the governments to a test. 126 Instead of development, the new-found wealth soon turned the fragile democracies
into autocratic governments. A form of neo-colonialism emerged.
Second, the financial burden occasioned by the huge investments in
oil and gas projects deprived the fragile democracies of much needed
financial reprieve to embark on the projects. 127
It is hoped that a fusion of the recommendations made in this work
will untie the Gordian knot of self-enrichment of political leaders
where the proceeds of oil are used to enrich themselves and leave the
local community in anguish and impoverishment. These oil companies fully aware of the level of decadence in governance and with
sophisticated machinery of lobby and maneuvering perpetuate dictators or democratic nuisance so they can continue their impunity.
Contracts are shrouded in secrecy; award of development initiatives
are carried out without regard to immediate needs of the local community.

126. See Gavin Hilson, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Extractive Industries, Experiences from Developing Countries, 37 RESOURCES POL’Y 131, 133
(2012) (analyzing how MNC have embraced corporate social responsibility in response to criticism of their actions in developing countries).
127. See id.

